There Was a Country: A Personal History of Biafra

Sources: Luckham, The Nigerian Military; Nwankwo and Ifejika, Biafra; Achuzia, Requiem Biafra; Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War; Schabowska and Himmelstrand, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis; Metz, Nigeria.

2. Gowon and Ojukwu were the two main protagonists of the Nigerian Civil War, yet they only ever met face-to-face once, and that meeting took place before the war. They never gave themselves the opportunity to actually sit down and discuss their views on the war, but even if such a conversation had taken place, there would likely have been no positive result. At least one thing becomes clear when their respective points of view are juxtaposed and analyzed: In their own minds, both Gowon and Ojukwu saw their own positions as non-negotiable.

Source: Smith, Stopping Wars, pp. 131–32.

THE ARISTOCRAT

3. Ojukwu, Encyclopedia Britannica, retrieved July 20, 2005; interviews with former Nigerian and Biafran soldiers, diplomats, and government officials, Achebe Foundation; McCaskie, “Nigeria”; Nelson, A Country Study; Nwankwo and Ifejika, Biafra; Schabowska and Himmelstrand, Africa Reports on the Nigerian Crisis; Smock, Ibo Politics; Metz, Nigeria.

4. Kalu Ogbaa, General Ojukwu. The Legend of Biafra (New York: Triatlantic Books, 2007).

5. Frederick Forsyth, as quoted in Ralph Uwechie, Reflections on the Nigerian Civil War: Facing the Future (published in cooperation with Trafford Publishing [Bloomington, IN], 2004), p. 146; © Ralph Uwechie.

6.Biafra: Fighting a War Without Guns, BBC documentary; producer: Michael Stewart; editor: Laurence Rees (1995).

7.

Despite all odds, Gowon and Ojukwu had ample opportunity to resolve the crisis without further bloodshed, but their personal dispositions toward each other would not let them put their egos behind them in the pursuit of a course nobler than the feelings of two individuals.

Source: Kalu N. Kalu, State Power, Autarchy, and Political Conquest in Nigerian Federalism (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008).

THE GENTLEMAN GENERAL

8. J. Isawa Elaigwu, Gowon: The Biography of a Soldier-Statesman (London: Adonis & Abbey Publishers, 2009); Achebe Foundation interviews. Number 15: General Yakubu Gowon in conversation with Pini Jason October, 16, 2005.

9. Madiebo, The Nigerian Revolution and the Biafran War.

10. Gowon was invited to Great Britain for a state visit soon after the war ended—the first Commonwealth African head of state to be treated this way—for a three-day affair. Gowon pulled all the stops and mesmerized the British.

11. Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Nigeria: Bulletin on Foreign Affairs 8, iss. 6–10 (1978).

12. Henry Robinson Luce, “General Gowon: The Binder of Wounds,” Time 95 January 26, 1970.

13. Statement attributed to Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu published in the Nigerian Outlook (Enugu) March 21, 1967, as quoted in Luckham, The Nigerian Military, p. 77, fn. 1.

14. Ojukwu is often referred to by his detractors as a

warmonger, but his life experiences and actions prior to the war challenge that assumption:

One of the most compelling ironies of Nigerian history is the fact that it was Ojukwu who freed Chief Obafemi Awolowo (of starvation is a legitimate weapon of war infamy) from Calabar prison even though historical revisionists would love this inconvenient fact to just disappear somehow and give the credit to Gowon. In addition, Ojukwu’s choice of Ado Bayero, the Emir of the ancient city of Kano in Northern Nigeria as chancellor of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, stemmed not only from a deep affection for Kano and its people, a city he had spent several years in, but clearly a feeling that Nigeria’s diversity was a strength and not a weakness!

Source: Ogbaa, General Ojukwu.

15. There has been great debate about Gowon’s role in the July 1966 coup. In his landmark study, The Nigerian Military, Robin Luckham sheds a great deal of light on the feelings of Eastern military officers concerning Gowon’s involvement. He finds these sentiments difficult to substantiate, but his analysis serves as an important illumination of the thoughts and mood of the Eastern military elite (see chapter II, “July 1966: The Junior Officers’ and NCOs’ Coup,” in the section Three Different Views of the Coup, pp. 62–63).

There are several sources, mainly Nigerian, that report that Gowon had an indeterminate role in the coup; other international sources, such as the following, are more candid in their opinions. The Economist of July 26, 1975, reported: “Brigadier Murtala Mohammed [sic], who has now taken over as Nigeria’s leader, was an instigator of General Gowon’s own 1966 coup and nearly got the top job then. He is alleged to have been involved in plots against General Gowon since then.”

According to editor Roy Godson, in Menace to Society: Political-Criminal Collaboration Around the World (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2003): “On July 29, 1966, a company of Hausa Army officers attacked and killed [Aguiyi Ironsi] and installed their own man, Major General Yakubu Gowon, in August 1966.” (“Slicing Nigeria’s National Cake,” by Obi N. I. Ebbe, p. 141).

16. Asked in 2005 whether he thought the war was inevitable, Gowon had this to say:

No! It was the action of the leaders! When it got to the stage whereby the leaders would not agree then a decision had to be taken. There would not have been a civil war had there not been secession! If there was no decision to break away from the country, certainly there wouldn’t have been any reason to start fighting. The civil war was as a result of the East and the leadership of Ojukwu deciding to break away. Now, I had a duty and responsibility. I swore allegiance to Nigeria, and Nigeria is composed of all the various parts. And the East was part of Nigeria. But the Ojukwu leadership, because of whatever reasons it had, and, of course, I know there were very strong reasons why he made certain decisions; but I know it was personal ambition more than anything else. Yes, unfortunate events had occurred, and I can assure you, if anyone had any sleepless night, it is because of the sort of thing that happened in Nigeria from 1966 up to that time.

Honestly, if you think that one enjoyed seeing the harrowing experiences of the Igbo in various parts of the country, especially in the Northern part of the country in 1966, I can assure you, you are wrong. Well God knows! And that was why one had to use certain expressions at the time in order to keep control of the people. I was accused of using the words: “God had called another Northerner, again, to lead.” But it was the only way I could bring sanity to bear on a situation galloping out of control. And we were able to bring the situation under control. Now I accept that those were very trying experiences for the Igbo that can make anybody say: well, you don’t want us, so we will go. At least, with our honest and sincere effort to get the situation under control, no matter what anyone would say, you can rest assured that we tried not to allow the situation to get to the stage whereby it resulted in civil war.

Source: Achebe Foundation interviews. Number 15, part 2: General Gowon in conversation with Pini Jason, October 31, 2005.

Ojukwu’s own take on the calamity that befell our nation is also salient: