“Thank you, Major Adams. I have been directed to give this presentation, as Major Adams said. I ask that you hold questions until the end, when I’ll open the floor for questions, and I can stay as long as you like,” Major Brayboy said, taking a pause. “First, I was just a small piece of this operation and do not know all the details of what happened or how it happened. What I experienced and saw is only a small part of the entire operation. Others may have a different view point on what went down. I can only give you my observations and personal opinion about this operation. I’m sure that fifty years from now, some expert may have a totally different perception of what transpired. Monday morning quarterbacking is twenty-twenty hindsight. I can only give you my opinion for the operation, right, wrong or indifferent.
“Second, let me say this operation was nothing like what we saw in Cambodia last year. Cambodia, I would have to say, was a low-intensity operation. This was not, and I think when I’m done, you’ll agree with me. The objective of the operation was to launch an attack that would disrupt the use of the Ho Chi Minh Trail for bringing supplies from North Vietnam south through Laos,” Major Brayboy stated.
“So what were Lam Son 719 and Dewey Canyon II? Both operations were conducted simultaneously, with the First ARVN Corps responsible for Lam Son 719 and the 101st Airborne and First Brigade, Fifth Mech responsible for Dewey Canyon II, which was really a deception operation to throw off the NVA.” Picking up a pointer, Major Brayboy indicated the town of Tchepone, Laos and Highway 9 on the map. “Lam Son 719 was a thrust by the ARVNs to destroy cache sites on the Ho Chi Minh Trail in the vicinity of Tchepone along Highway 9.”
Pausing to allow everyone to study the map, he continued, “US helicopter support was critical to Lam Son 719, and included Army and Marine Corps aircraft as well as Air Force Jolly Green Giants to pick up downed crews. The 101st Aviation Group staged out of Camp Eagle. In the case of the 14th Combat Aviation Battalion, they staged our of Quang Tri. We staged out of Dong Ha. Refueling was out of Kha Sanh, which the Fifth Mech opened in the first week of February. We were based at Dong Ha, which was nothing when we arrived. I mean nothing—no showers, no latrines, no buildings. Nothing except a runway and tower. Us and the Forty-Eighth Assault Helicopter Company were located there, along with the 223rd Aviation Battalion headquarters, which had been a fixed-wing battalion until they were assigned five helicopter units to manage in this operation.”
A few murmurs of disbelief could be heard as everyone knew that a fixed-wing battalion staff wouldn’t know how to plan and coordinate combat assault helicopter operations. Turning back to his map board and pointing, he continued his presentation. “The first phase of the operation had US forces moving up to the Vietnam-Laotian border along Highway 9 in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. This highway passed through the abandoned base of Khe Sanh. The second phase called for an ARVN mech/armor force to move along Highway 9, pass through US forces and attack to seize the town of Tchepone in Laos. Major NVA supply bases were located around Tchepone, Laos. The northern flanks of this ground advance would be secured by elements of ARVN Airborne and Ranger infantry units conducting airmobile operations and the First ARVN Infantry Division airmobile assaults to secure the southern flanks. US helicopters would provide the lift capability for this portion of the operation. In the third phase, search-and-destroy missions were conducted to find and eliminate NVA supply dumps in the area of Tchepone. The last phase would be the withdrawal back down Highway 9 into Vietnam. That was the plan. The question asked was whether this operation could be carried out without US helicopter support. The answer was a resounding no.”
Pausing long enough to take a drink of coffee that had been placed on a table next to the map, Major Brayboy continued, “Unfortunately, the plan was not well executed for a variety of reasons, one being that the enemy had a vote on the execution. Too little planning time, bad intelligence, too few resources, poor coordination and personality conflicts all contributed to the failure of the operation in my opinion. On January 30, US ground forces began moving on Highway 9 to reopen the abandoned firebase at Khe Sanh. By February 5, Route 9 to the Laotian border was open and secured. Phase II was initiated on February 8, when the ARVN Airborne Division executed it’s attack to seize the intermediate objective, the town of A Luoi in Laos and conducted multiple insertions securing the right flank along Highway 9. Ranger units, under the ARVN Airborne Division command, inserted on hilltops to screen the right flank with ARVN First Armored Brigade moving on Highway 9, which was an unimproved dirt road. Simultaneously, two insertions were conducted by First ARVN Infantry Division on the left flank to prevent enemy forces from flank attacks on the south. On February 15, a new airstrip was opened at Khe Sanh as the old strip was no longer usable. Initially, casualties around Khe Sanh were almost nonexistent as the NVA had few forces in the area but did shell the area every night with artillery and mortars.” This comment brought a low murmur from the audience. Most of the pilots had been on the receiving end of rockets or mortars, but none had experienced being shelled by artillery.
“Across the border, it was estimated that the NVA had approximately twenty-two thousand soldiers, both combat and support personnel as well as some guerrilla fighters. Intelligence also estimated between one hundred seventy to two hundred antiaircraft weapons would be in the area. In addition, it was believed that two divisions from the north could reinforce in fourteen days. Truth be told, they had a lot more than what the intel weenies told us they would have.”
One of the soldiers standing by the map board pulled an acetate sheet over the map that indicated
enemy forces in red, to include anti-aircraft positions. Some soft whistling could be heard above the grasps of breath. Major Brayboy waited for the acetate overlay to be in place before he continued.
“By February 8, five divisions and seven regiments of artillery, antiaircraft weapons, and some tank battalions, totaling sixty thousand troops, were identified in the area facing the ARVN advance. From the start, the cross-border attack was difficult. The massive tactical air strikes planned to precede the ground attack were called off because of bad weather. The ground attack on Highway 9 traveled through the Sepon River valley became bogged down because of the poor condition of the road. The condition of Highway 9 was such that much of the resupply fell on helicopter support since wheeled vehicles couldn’t traverse the highway without difficulty.
“Approximately halfway to Tchepone, the ARVN forces stopped, consolidating at the town of A Luoi on February 11. The consolidation was reported to be a strategic pause to assess the enemy’s intentions. They did not continue the attack until March 3. Helicopters in support on day one came under intense enemy small-arms fire from the surrounding hills that looked down on the valley, but it was minor compared to what was unleashed starting on February 11 and for the remainder of the operation, when 23-millimeter, 37-millimeter and 100-millimeter guns opened up on us.”
Groans replaced murmurs at this point from the audience. Again Major Brayboy paused to let the fact that a “strategic pause” had lasted almost thirty days and anti-aircraft fire had increased significantly sink in.
“North Vietnam’s response was initially slow due to deceptive actions being carried out. With the ground attack stalled at A Luoi, the decision was made to seize Tchepone with an airmobile assault conducted by the ARVN First Division. On March 3, two lifts were conducted, resulting in eleven helicopters shot down and forty-four damaged inserting one battalion. On March 6, two hundred and seventy-six assault helicopters escorted by Cobra gunships and fighter aircraft conducted the largest airmobile operation of the war. Only one aircraft was shot down. Tchepone was seized, but little was found as the South Vietnamese command felt that the objective was reaching the town, not moving into the major supply dumps north of the town. On March 9, the order was given to begin withdrawing, which was carried out through the month. Casualties and captured ARVN soldiers were high. Helicopter losses were equally high. Besides helicopter losses, US Air Force aircraft were also taking losses to enemy antiaircraft fire. NVA losses were equally huge, but the tenacity, courage and discipline that they displayed carried the day for them.” Major Brayboy paused and took another drink from his coffee.
“As the fighting retreat progressed, helicopter losses increased due to the requirement for them to provide so much of the resupply and evacuation support. When it was evident to the NVA that the ARVNs were retreating, they closed in for the kill, maintaining close contact, negating the ARVN and US advantage of close air and artillery support. Undermanned firebases initially established in the beginning of the operation were being overturned on a frequent basis. All told, one hundred and sixty-eight helicopters were destroyed, with another six hundred and eighteen damaged. US helicopters flew over one hundred and sixty thousand sorties. Nineteen pilots were killed, with one hundred and eight wounded. Eleven more are still carried as missing in action.” Murmurs could be heard throughout the audience.37
Another acetate sheet was placed over the map and Major Brayboy continued his presentation, pointing to the blue graphics that indicated the friendly forces’ plan. “Our first mission was on February 8. At the same time, the 101st Aviation units were conducting missions as well to insert two firebases north of Highway 9, while we conducted two missions to insert two firebases south of Highway 9. On that morning, First ARVN Mech Brigade, under the command of First ARVN Airborne, launched a ground assault along Highway 9 along with an Air Cav troop screening to the front. Our first lift consisted of forty aircraft making two turns for a total of eighty sorties, with twenty of my aircraft and twenty from the 48th Assault Helicopter Company as well as all our Charlie model gunships. The 48th was flight lead for the day. I was chalk 21.”
In the audience, heads were turning and murmured comments could be heard.
“Flight time for PZ to the one-ship LZ was about ten minutes with no artillery prep.”
Comments from the audience, such as “You’re nuts,” and “You’ve got to be kidding!” became much louder with that information.
“I know that sounds crazy, but we had friendly forces on the LZ, so we were confident that we would meet little resistance. As you can imagine, some aircraft were just leaving the PZ with their first load when aircraft were returning to get their second load. We took no fire on this insertion as the intel people had told us to expect none. The pickup zone was the same for both lifts that day. We also received a flight of Cobras for the second lift. The second LZ was seven kilometers from the first, and intel indicated it would also be fairly quiet. It was also a one-ship LZ. A B-52 strike went in early that morning.” Moving back to the map, Major Brayboy pointed at the flight route.
“As we approached the LZ, we initially received some small-arms fire. As we got closer we came under anti-aircraft fire from 12.7 weapons. I was shot down in the LZ, as was another aircraft. Every aircraft in that lift took hits.” Again murmers rose from the audience and not too quietly. “Where the hell were the guns?” “Who was directing this fiasco?” and “What about the artillery?”comments were repeated several times.
Continuing his presentation, Major Brayboy said, “We came in at altitude and made normal approaches with forty-five-second separation. Gunships expended on the first lift, so there was a scramble to get additional gun cover on the second turn. A C&C aircraft from the Cav was at four thousand feet when he took hits in his fuel cell and caught fire. The last we saw, he was in a slow roll, going in upside down.”
The faces of those in the audience reflected their shock. No one had experienced fighting of this intensity when in III Corps, or Cambodia. At this point, Major Brayboy had everyone’s attention. As he continued to explain the events he had witnessed for those forty-five days, it became obvious to everyone that they were entering into a new and much more deadly kind of fight that Army Aviation had not been exposed to before.
Wrapping up his presentation after an hour, Major Brayboy asked rhetorically, “So, gentlemen, what were some of the lessons we learned in my opinion? First, contour flight is the only way to fly in formations or single-ship. Flying at altitude will only get you killed as you cannot fly high enough to avoid radar-guided weapons, anti-aircraft missiles or high-explosive anti-aircraft guns. Second, the Charlie model gunship is too antiquated for this environment. It’s too slow and cannot carry a sufficient payload for these operations at these elevations. Only the Cobras had the payload and fuel to provide adequate cover. Third, the OH-58 LOH is inadequate for this environment as it doesn’t have the maneuverability or power. Fourth, the tactic of a little bird, low and slow, is a surefire way to get shot down. The Cobras couldn’t fly high to cover the LOH due to the anti-aircraft fire, so the LOH became very vulnerable. Fifth, throwing together units that have never worked together before or never worked in assault helicopter operations is an excellent way of introducing confusion. The 223rd Aviation Battalion attempted to do it right, but a lot was missing that should have been SOP, especially as they were attempting to support two major operations going in two separate directions. Sixth, the CH-47 lacks the power needed to haul the one-five-five howitzer at these elevations and conditions. We had to rely on the Marine Corps aircraft for heavy lift missions. Seventh, we need a way for attack aircraft to take out tanks. We had a few Cobras with 20-millimeter guns that could take out the PT76s that we encountered, but nothing to take out the T-55 tanks. We need something that can do that. Lastly, the Huey is a great aircraft but vulnerable in these conditions. We need an aircraft that can fly faster, with redundant systems. That concludes my briefing. What are your questions?” Major Brayboy asked as he picked up another cup of coffee that was handed to him.
“Sir, Mr. Zuccardi. What do you see for the future of Army Aviation under these conditions?” Bob asked.
“This is the battlefield of the future in my opinion. This was high-intensity. Eleven pilots are missing, we had nineteen pilots killed and we had one hundred and eight wounded, as well as over six hundred aircraft with battle damage, all in a forty-five-day period. And those numbers do not include crew members lost, killed or wounded. We need better aircraft to withstand this intensity. We need better tactics for this intensity. We need better training for this intensity. Without those three things, we’ll be like B-17 crews in World War Two—expendable.”38
Chapter 37
Aircraft Down
“Major Adams, we have an aircraft down,” Captain Curran said as he walked into Major Adams’s office. This was becoming a common statement as April and May continued to see Chicken-man aircraft taking some serious damage. Shooting from the ridge-lines at low-flying aircraft made it easy for the NVA to take down an aircraft as they approached landing zones in either combat assaults or single-ship resupply missions. Most missions were one- and two-ship resupply runs, which didn’t warrant a gunship escort, so those missions were mostly on their own for support. Maintenance was having a difficult time keeping up the availability due to the battle damage that was being experienced. Crews weren’t taking a lot of battle damage physically, but mentally they were wearing down. Doc Christeson was seeing more cases of sleep deprivation not from long flying hours but from the inability of individuals to sleep. In order to meet the mission demands, three aircraft with crews were attached to the company from another unit down on the coast of Vietnam.
Lieutenant Alston Gore, who had been briefing the major on some personnel issues, asked, “Who is it? Are they okay?”
“Sir, it’s one of the attached aircraft,” Captain Curran said, turning to Lieutenant Gore. “And to answer your question, it appears only one crew member made it, and he’s hurt. I can’t say for certain until the other two aircraft get in and we’re absolutely sure who went down.”