This Isn't the Sort of Thing That Happens to Someone Like You

Water/Waste:

Compost toilets already fully functioning. Obv. need to ensure high hygiene standards maintained – any digestive illness wd be disastrous at time of crisis. Recent lapses in hygiene practice have been noted – to raise at next meeting.

Need for additional rainwater collection & storage. Cd be most important (& overlooked) aspect of crisis – energy restrictions will wreck mains water system. Also prone to sabotage by vested interest and/or forced medication by authority (eg emergency population reduction?).8

Relations with other Groups/Community:

Strong policy trend within group to building greater links with local community and with other s/s9 groups regionally. Need to argue against this. Risk of spreading resources too thinly, + raising awareness locally of resources here, + risk of exploitation and/or betrayal. (Theft, bad faith, attack, occupation, information-passing, etc etc.) Also risk of undue emotional attachment which would impact decision-making at time of crisis.

Group Analysis:iv

8 adult members of group (6 male, 2 female), w/ at least one other female + infant attempting to join. One current member not full-time resident, although otherwise fully committed.

3 children (plus potential infant).

Analysis:

J – late 30s, in relationship w/ R, 2 children. Good health. Expert in tunnel-digging, also general construction etc. Likely early member of PDTFG.10 High understanding of likely impact of crisis. Father of D, 10 month old, son of L who he had brief relationship with last year. L & D now want to join group; with obv. emotional/dynamic impact.

P11 – late 20s, currently single, 1 child not resident at property w/ minimal contact (good). Very good health. Expert in construction, strategy, logistics, unarmed combat. Early member of PDTFG (obv!). High awareness/understanding of crisis.

T – late 50s, divorced, children not known of, minimal contact w/ ex-wife & apparent minimal emotional attachment/concern. Background in forestry/conservation(!), expert in planting & plant maintenance, also expert in insulation/draught-proofing etc. Likely to be unsupportive of PDTFG, or any form of force resistance; but also unlikely to actively oppose it.

S – early 50s, 13 y/o daughter, Z, relationship with Z’s father unknown & undiscussed. Not always in good health. Unsupportive of crisis strategies; argues in favour of closer ties with local community. Poses significant risk to maintenance of secrecy. Current links w/ wider community risk issues of emotional attachment at the crisis time.

R – late 30s, in relationship with J, 2 children (T, 5, B, 8). Expert in electrical generation & maintenance. Also likely early member of PDTFG; has mentioned being in Cadet Force while at school, so useful expertise. Good understanding of crisis, altho sceptical (& sarcastic) at times.

B – early 20s, v. enthusiastic & energetic altho w/ limited practical skills. Key member of PDTFG, also of PWG. Prime potential for links with weapon sources; altho discussion of these links raises separate concerns & needs to be handled carefully. Good health but drinks & uses drugs v. heavily. Emotional attachments unknown; has alluded to number of short-term relationships within activist & party circles, unclear how these arise or are terminated but no evidence of undue emotional impacts.

M12 – early 30s (??), no known relationships or sig. emotional ties. Expert in unarmed combat, also enthusiastic contribution to construction tasks. Well connected in activist circles, thus often absent from site, but contributes well to workload anyway. Apparent ready access to cash & willingness to contribute. Highly engaged in discussion of crisis & response; some members of group critical/wary of this. Not yet discussed PDTFG, but likely to be keen early member.

N – mid 60s, minimal relationship ties (has alluded to ex-partner & children, but no known contact with them to date; whereabouts unknown). Expert in food production, crop management, storage, etc. Prime source of expertise within group in this field. Often in poor health, w/ tendency to unusual diet & supplement regimes to combat this. Strictly vegan. Also has pronounced pacifist tendencies; has referred to surrender as a viable option in the face of armed assault, has also argued in favour of close links with local community and other resilient groups. Dangerously influential, altho presents as soft-spoken/passive etc etc. Will need to be kept completely unaware of PDTFG.

Children – ages 5, 8, 13. Also possible 10-month-old baby joining group. 13 y/o and 8 y/o should be able to contribute useful labour at time of crisis & in preparation for it. 5 y/o obv. less use & req. more resources (also reduces available labour from parents). Admittance of baby wd be v. poor choice by group: extra resource demand + v. reduced labour from that parent; also significant burden in event of siege/tunnel/escape procedure; also at high risk of ill-health and resultant emotional strain. (Also, parentage situation in this case will presumably cause sig. probs w/ relationship dynamics, tensions & conflict etc, at cost to effective co-operation and shared labour.)

Re 13 y/o girl, note that presence is useful in terms of long-term breeding reqs. of group.

Group Analysis Summary:

Good mix of skills and experience. Mostly good health. V. young and v. old members of group remain a concern; continue to slant discussions towards options for leaving site and being replaced by members of more appropriate age; when sourcing replacement members suggest addressing current gender imbalance with view to long-term breeding reqs. of group.

Majority of group are engaged w/ problem of crisis & preparation for it, altho small maj. opposed to armed defence. However, small minority not always serious in their discussion of issue; provocative/sarcastic/unhelpful. Recent remarks to effect that sexual activity/attachment wd reduce attention to detail as re crisis preparation were particularly unhelpful. Predict this minority won’t always consider subject worthy of humour.

Assessment of External Threats:

Working down from top:

Assume, at crisis, central & local authorities will withdraw to defendable spaces with existing supplies/stocks, & not form any threat to resilient groups across the periphery of their territory.

Police/military will be primarily focused on maintaining order in larger population centres and/or protecting significant infrastructure. (Certainly on protecting any remaining supply chain, eg any food production & distribution centres which are able to continue functioning.) Threat from police/military therefore likely to be limited: however police/military also unlikely to prevent threats from other parties such as eg:

Immediate neighbours. Early stages of crisis likely to see requests for assistance from local residents, followed by unpleasant coercion/emotional blackmail etc, followed by covert attacks (attempted night-theft) or co-ordinated overt attacks (direct armed assault, eg by mob w/ handtools or by pseudo-militia w/ weapons). Covert attacks shd be prevented by perimeter defences & by good surveillance. Overt attacks will need to be repelled by direct display of superior force, deadly force if req. (See Defence, below.) Since a la

rge & co-ordinated overt attack will have a numerical advantage it will be important to prevent one arising. Careful surveillance & intelligence (perhaps by false negotiation) could assist in this; a pre-emptive strike or strikes may become necessary.13

Mobile groups. As the crisis matures, mobile groups may well develop, poss. from major population centres; these will be small groups and majority young/male. Likely to be physically weak due to fatigue of travel + unreliable nutrition; but prob. well armed (esp. if from major pop. centres) & experienced/uninhibited in use of deadly force. These groups will be the prime threat as crisis matures: careful surveillance will be essential, as will avoiding unnecessary awareness of site. Research plan for decoy vulnerable site (eg lit, smoke from chimney, obvious food supply) which can be booby-trapped.14 Prepare others in group, esp. members of Primary Defence Task Force Group, for use of deadly/overwhelming force. (Again, utilise reference to poss. impact on children in event of defence failure as motivating tactic.)

Rogue loners. Individuals unlikely to survive crisis, as limited amount of co-operation will be req. However some are likely to appear, esp. in early stages, and will have advantage of low profile. Reminder that sustained & effective surveillance, with appropriate follow-up action, will be essential throughout period of crisis.