FROM CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS WASH DC 0440 GREENWICH 13 APR 43
TO USS ALFRED THOMAS DD107
REFERENCE MSG 43-100-656 DATED 1 APR 43 SUBJECT LOCATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF CERTAIN VESSELS BELIEVED TO BE OPERATING IN SOUTH ATLANTIC OCEAN.
PRIORITY OF SEARCH SHOULD BE DIRECTED TO LOCATION AND POSITIVE REPEAT POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF SPANISH REGISTERED COMERCIANTE DEL OCEANO PACIFICO. SUBJECT VESSEL DESCRIBED IN DETAIL IN REFERENCE ABOVE AND IS LISTED WITH PHOTOGRAPH ON PAGE 123 IN 1938 JANES MER-CHANT SHIPS OF THE WORLD.
SUBJECT VESSEL BELIEVED BOUND FOR RIVER PLATE ES-TUARY AND WAS LAST REPORTED 1300 GREENWICH 8 APR 43 AT 8 DEGREES 33 MINUTES NORTH LATITUDE 26 DEGREES 55 MINUTES WEST LO
NGITUDE.
ON DETERMINING LOCATION CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERA-TIONS WILL BE ADVISED PRIORITY OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TOGETHER WITH YOUR ESTIMATED TIME OF ARRIVAL MOUTH OF RIVER PLATE.
ALFRED THOMAS WILL NOT REPEAT NOT BOARD SUBJECT VESSEL OR CONDUCT ANY ACTIVITY IN HER REGARD WHICH MIGHT POSSIBLY BE CONSTRUED AS VIOLATION OF RULES OF SEA WARFARE IN RE PASSAGE OF NON-COMBATANT VESSELS BE-TWEEN NEUTRAL PORTS.
ON LOCATION OF SUBJECT VESSEL, ALFRED THOMAS WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH SUBJECT VESSEL UNTIL FUR-THER ORDERS AND WILL FURNISH POSITION EVERY FOUR (4) HOURS UNLESS THERE IS A CHANGE OF HER COURSE SUGGEST- ING A CHANGE OF DESTINATION.
BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
QUIMMER VICE ADMIRAL
The chart over which Clancy and Lacey were bent traced the course of seven merchantmen they-and probably every other U.S. Navy vessel operat-ing in the South Atlantic-had been directed to "monitor."
Skippers of other U.S. Navy men-of-war were almost certainly wondering what the hell was going on, and one did not radio the Chief of Naval Operations to ask for the reason behind an order.
But Captain Jernigan was sure he knew exactly what was going on-al-though he had not been officially told. He thought the Alfred Thomas had been selected from among the other ships on station, not so much because of its lo-cation, but rather because the Chief of Naval Operations knew that he would correctly guess what was going on.
The Alfred Thomas had been involved in the sinking of the Reine de la Mer in Samboromb¢n Bay. A torpedo from the U.S. submarine Devilfish had actu-ally sunk the ship, but Devilfish could not have gotten into position to fire her torpedo without the assistance of the Alfred Thomas.
When they received the first message to "monitor" the seven merchantmen, Jernigan immediately decided that Naval Intelligence-or maybe the OSS- had determined that the Germans were sending a replacement, which they could be expected to do, but were unable to determine which of the seven it was.
And obviously, at least to Captain Jernigan of the Alfred Thomas, ONI and/or the OSS now thought the Comerciante del Oceano Pacifico was proba-bly the ship they were looking for. Probably was the operative word. If they were more certain, they would have ordered the Alfred Thomas to board the Oceano Pacifico or, possibly, even to sink her.
When the second message came, Clancy, at Jernigan's orders, set up a sweeping course that would possibly allow them to intercept her-presuming the Oceano Pacifico maintained her last known course.
Lookouts were ordered aloft around the clock, and of course there was the radar, which was supposed to have a range of fifty miles, and which Captain Jernigan trusted as profoundly as he trusted gentlemen in two-tone shoes and gold bracelets who operated businesses called "Honest Albert's Hardly Used Automobiles."
After days of fruitless search, Jernigan had just about decided that the search course Clancy set was the wrong one-his fault, not Clancy's; he gave the order to follow it-when, to his genuine surprise, two hours after nightfall the day before, the radar operator reported a "target" thirty miles away, on a heading that would ultimately lead to the River Plate estuary.
Jernigan ordered Clancy to set up an interception course that would place them eight miles off the unknown vessel, on a parallel course.
That was just close enough for the lookout to report bright lights on the horizon. Bright lights suggested a neutral vessel-they sailed with floodlights lighting huge national flags painted on their hulls-but there was no way to fur-ther identify her without moving closer, and Jernigan was unwilling to do that at night. The Alfred Thomas took up a parallel course ten miles to starboard.
Jernigan then went to bed, in the belief that he should be well-rested when it came time to make decisions in the morning. After at least thirty minutes in his bunk, he realized that falling asleep in these circumstances fell in the cate-gory of wishful thinking. He showered and returned to the bridge.
It was now daylight. The vessel, whoever it was, was not visible to the lookouts, but still presented a good target to the radar.
Jernigan realized that it was of course likely that if it was the Oceano Pacifico, she would also be equipped with radio direction and ranging apparatus, and know that there was a ship just a few miles away.
It was also likely that if it was the Oceano Pacifico, she was armed. Putting a submarine-replenishment vessel into position in Samboromb¢n Bay was of critical importance to German submarine operations in the South Atlantic.
With the naval cannon that could be placed aboard a merchantman, the Al-fred Thomas of course would have the advantage. Unless, of course, the captain of the other vessel decided to take a long shot and opened up without warning with everything he had.
Jernigan glanced at his watch.
The crew had been fed.
"Set a course which will bring us within visual range, Mr. Clancy," he or-dered. "How long would you estimate that would take?"